At AES'00, a collision attack on 7-round reduced AES was proposed. In this paper, we apply this idea to seven SPN block ciphers, , and Anubis. Applying our attacks on AES-192/256, we improve the attack result based on meet-in-the-middle attack (AES-192) and the attack result proposed in AES'00 (AES-256), respectively. Our attack result on Anubis is superior to known cryptanalytic result on it. In the cases of Crypton-192/256 and mCrypton-96/128, our attacks are applicable to 8-round reduced versions. The attack results on mCrypton-96/128 are more practical than known cryptanalytic results on them.
Introduction
Recently, meet-in-the-middle attack has received attention. The attack procedure of meet-in-the-middle attack can be summarized as follows. Let M be the message space and K the key space. Suppose that and : M × K → M are two block ciphers and let = ∘ . In this attack, an attacker tries to deduce from a given plaintext/ciphertext pair = ( ) by trying to solve ( ) = −1 ( ). In some cases, the equation is not tested for all the bits of the intermediate encryption value, but rather for only some of them. So far, many meet-in-the-middle attack results on block cipher have been proposed [1, 2] . On the other hand, Gilbert and Minier proposed a collision attack on 7-round of AES in [3] . This attack is a type of meet-in-the middle attack and exploits a 4-round distinguisher. In general, block cipher is completely deterministic, that is, if it is run again with the exact same input values, identical output values will be produced. Similarly, the different input values result in the different output values. However, it is possible that the different input values result in the output values of which the specific parts are the same. We call this case a collision.
In this paper, we apply the main idea of [3] to seven SPN block ciphers, such as AES-192/256 [4] , Crypton [5] , mCrypton-96/128 [6] , and Anubis [7] . Table 1 shows our attack results on them. Rijndael was announced as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001. After DES, it is one of the most widely used and analyzed ciphers in the world. AES is a 128-bit block cipher and accepts key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. These versions of AES are called AES-128/192/256 and the number of rounds for these versions is 10, 12, and 14, respectively. Our attacks on AES-192/256 require a computational complexity of 2 69.2 encryptions with 2 32 chosen plaintexts and 2 74 memory bytes, respectively. Though our attacks on them are not applicable to the full AES-192/256, these are superior to the attack results of [1] (AES-192) and [3] (AES-256), respectively.
Crypton is a 128-bit block cipher submitted as a candidate for the AES proposal of NIST. This algorithm has a 12-round SPN structure with 128/192/256-bit secret keys. According to the length of the secret keys, we call them Crypton-128/192/256, respectively. Our attack is applicable to 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256. To our knowledge, truncated differential cryptanalysis on 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256 has the best results on them, so far [8] . The attacks on an 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256 need the computational complexity of 2 161.6 encryptions with 2 96 chosen plaintexts and 2 138 memory bytes, respectively. Compared to the attack results of [8] , our attacks decrease the data complexity but increase the computational complexity. A 64-bit block cipher mCrypton was designed as a reduced version of Crypton for a ubiquitous environment. It provides low-resource hardware implementation, which is suitable for low-end devices such as RFID tags and wireless sensor network. Several security aspects related to RFID tags and wireless sensor network have already been studied. mCrypton has 12 rounds and supports the 64/96/128-bit secret keys. Our attack is applicable to mCrypton-96/128. We require the computational complexity of 2 81.6 encryptions with 2 48 chosen plaintexts and 2 65 memory bytes. However, this is not the best result on them, since related-key impossible differential cryptanalysis on 9-round reduced mCrypton-96/128 was proposed in [9] . However, considering the attack assumption of a related-key attack, our attacks are more practical than it.
Anubis is a block cipher submitted to the NESSIE project and operates on data blocks of 128 bits, accepting keys of length 32 bits ( = 4, . . . , 10). It is a Rijndael variant that uses involutions for the various operations. Our attack is applicable to Anubis where the length of the secret key is longer than 192 bits. We need the computational complexity of 2 161.6 encryptions with 2 96 chosen plaintexts and 2 138 memory bytes. This result is superior to known cryptanalytic results on this algorithm. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose collision attacks on AES-192/256. Collision attacks on Crypton-192/256 and mCrypton-96/128 are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a collision attack on Anubis. In each section, we start with a brief description of the block cipher concerned. Finally, we give our conclusion in Section 5. The SB, SR, MC, and ARK transformations are applied to each round except that MC is omitted in the last round. Besides, before the first round, an extra ARK is applied, which we call a whitening key step. For the more detailed descriptions of AES-192/256, we refer to [4] . We omit the key schedules of them, as they do not affect our attacks.
Collision Attacks on 7-Round

Finding a 4-Round Distinguisher of AES.
In our attack on AES, we use a 4-round distinguisher of round 2∼5. We consider an input value 2 of round 2 in AES which is constructed as follows: By using 2 , we can construct the following equations on 3 ( = 0, . . . , 3). Here, means the entry of the coefficient matrix of MC ( = 0, . . . , 3): (1)
Note that each 
Note that this equation consists of five parts as follows:
If we find different ( ) with the probability of 0.5.
We can express
5 by using 5 as follows. Here, −1 means the inverse of a function
If we obtain different ( by using (5) . That is, with the probability of 0.5, we can find 
Collision Attack on a 7-Round
Reduced AES. Now, we show how to exploit a 4-round distinguisher constructed in the previous subsection in order to attack a 7-round reduced AES.
Similarly to the previous subsection, 5 can be expressed by using 7 as follows:
For the simplicity of notations, SR (6) are denoted by RK 6 * and RK 7 * , respectively. Our attack procedure on AES is as follows (see Figure 2 ). 
Collision Attacks on 8-Round Reduced Crypton-192/256 and mCrypton-96/128
In this section, we present collision attacks on 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256 and mCrypton-96/128. Our attacks on 8-round reduced mCrypton-96/128 are similar to them on 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256. Thus, we mainly introduce the attacks on 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256. Furthermore, similarly to the attacks on AES-192/256, the attack procedure on Crypton-192 (mCrypton-96) is the same as that on Crypton-256 (mCrypton-128). Thus, for the simplicity of notations, we just call them Crypton-192/256 (mCrypton-96/128) and Crypton (mCrypton). First, we briefly present Crypton and mCrypton. Figure 3 The round function consists of applying in sequence four operations, the S-box transformation , the bit permutation , the byte transposition , and the key addition , to the 4×4 byte array. More specifically, the odd round function RK and the even round function RK are defined (for a round key RK) as follows:
Crypton and mCrypton. As shown in
(ii) RK = RK ∘ ∘ ∘ for even rounds.
For the more detailed descriptions of Crypton, we refer to [5] . Similarly to our attacks on AES-192/256, our attacks on Crypton do not also consider the key schedule of this algorithm. Thus, we omit its key schedules.
mCrypton is a 64-bit lightweight block cipher designed for use in low-cost and resource-constrained applications such as RFID tags and sensors in wireless sensor networks. As shown in Figure 3(b) , it has a 12-round SPN structure and supports the 64/96/128-bit secret keys. The overall structure of mCrypton is similar to Crypton except that mCrypton is based on nibble-oriented operations (note that Crypton is based on byte-oriented operations).
Collision Attacks on an 8-Round Reduced
Crypton. First, we explain the way to find a distinguisher of Crypton. By using a similar method in the attack on AES-192/256, we can also construct a 4-round distinguisher of Crypton. Furthermore, because of the weak diffusion property of Crypton, we can extend this distinguisher to a 5-round distinguisher of it. In detail, our attacks on an 8-round reduced Crypton consider a 5-round distinguisher of round 2 ∼ 6.
Recall that, in the attack on AES-192/256, an equation on 5 00 can be constructed by using 2 . We apply this method to
Crypton. As a result, we obtain an equation on 6 30 by using 2 . Similarly to AES-192/256, this equation consists of five parts as follows. Here, means a masking byte used in and "∧" is a bitwise AND operation
On the other hand, 6 can be written by using 6 as follows: The overall attack procedure is similar to the case of AES. Figure 5 presents our attack procedure on an 8-round reduced Crypton. The method to compute 6 from 8 is shown in
.
The complexities of this attack are as follows:
(i) the data complexity: 2 96 chosen plaintexts;
(ii) the memory complexity: 2 133 memory bytes;
(iii) the computational complexity: 2 161.6 encryptions.
So far, the best attack result was the truncated differential cryptanalysis on 8-round reduced Crypton-192/256 proposed in [8] . This attack requires the computational complexity of 2 126.2 encryptions with 2 126 chosen plaintexts, respectively. Compared to these results, our attack decreases the data complexity but increases the computational complexity.
Collision Attacks on an 8-Round Reduced mCrypton.
As shown in Figure 5 , the attack procedure on mCrypton is the same as that on Crypton except that it is based on nibbleoriented operations (recall that Crypton is based on byteoriented operations). In detail, our attack on mCrypton uses (9) as a checking equation and 6 is computed from 8 by using (10) .
Since the size of internal state of mCrypton is half of that in Crypton, the complexities of the attack on mCrypton are half of them on Crypton. The complexities of the attack on mCrypton are as follows:
(i) the data complexity: 2 48 chosen plaintexts;
(ii) the memory complexity: 2 81.6 memory bytes;
(iii) the computational complexity: 2 65 encryptions.
In [9] , related-key impossible differential cryptanalysis on 9-round reduced mCrypton-96/128 was proposed. The attack on a 9-round reduced mCrypton-96 needs the computational complexity of 2 74.9 encryptions with 2 59.9 chosen plaintexts. In the case of a 9-round reduced mCrypton-128, we need the computational complexity of 2 66.7 encryptions with 2 59.7
chosen plaintexts. To our knowledge, these are the best results on mCrypton-96/128. However, considering the attack assumption of a related-key attack, our attacks are more practical than it.
Collision Attack on an 8-Round Reduced Anubis
First, we present Anubis, and then a collision attack on an 8-round reduced Anubis is introduced.
Anubis.
As shown in Figure 6 , Anubis is a 128-bit block cipher with variable-length keys from 128 bits to 320 bits in steps of 32 bits. The number of rounds depends on the length of the secret key: at least 12 (for the 128-bit secret key), plus one extra round for each additional 32 bits. For example, when the length of the secret key is 192(= 128 + 2 ⋅ 32) bits, the number of rounds is 14(= 12 + 2). Anubis processes blocks of 128 bits in the form of 4 × 4 byte array and uses the same indices as AES (see Figure 1) . Similarly to block ciphers concerned in the previous sections, in round , we denote input/output values and round key , , and RK , respectively. The round function of Anubis consists of sixteen 8 × 8 Sbox parallel lookups, a linear transformation (matrix transposition followed by multiplication by a constant MDS diffusion matrix), and the round key addition. These transformations are defined as follows: For the more detailed descriptions of Anubis, we refer to [7] . Similarly to the previous sections, we omit their key schedules, as they do not affect our attacks. 
Collision Attacks on an 8-Round Reduced
5-round distinguisher
Check! method of the attack introduced in the previous sections, we can obtain the following equation on 
On the other hand, 6 can be written by using 6 as follows:
Thus, we use the following equation as a checking equation 
The attack procedure on an 8-round reduced Anubis is similar to that on block ciphers proposed in the previous sections. Figure 7 presents our attack procedure on an 8-round reduced Anubis. In our attack, the method to compute 6 
The complexities of this attack is as follows:
So far, the best attack results on Anubis are a collision attack and a square attack on a 7-round reduced version [11] . A collision attack on a 7-round reduced Anubis requires the computational complexity of 2 140 encryptions with 2 32 chosen plaintexts. In the case of a square attack on this algorithm, we need the computational complexity of 2 120 encryptions with 2
128
∼2 119 chosen plaintexts. Thus, our attack result is superior to these cryptanalytic results.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced collision attacks on seven SPN block ciphers, 7-round reduced AES-192/256, 8-round
